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The death o l the livinq wi
Thefollowing article is based on "Enough:The Failure ofthe Living Wil1,"which appeared in

-

the March-April 2004 Hastings Center Report.
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Enough. The living will has failed, and it is time to say so.
We should have known it would fail: A notable but neglected psychological literature always provided arresung reasons to expect the
policy of living wills to misfire. Given their alluring potential, perhaps
they were worth trying. But a crescendoing empirical literature and
persistent clinical disappointments reveal that the rewards of the
campaign to promote

1s do not justify its costs.

Nor can any degree of tinkering CYer make the liYing will an

activity is constant. Senators Rockefeller, Collins, and Specter

cffcctiYc instrument of social policy. As the cYidcnce of failure
has mounted, liYing wills haYe lost some of their friends. We offer

have introduced bills to "strengthen" the PSDA and living wills,

systematic support for their change of heart. But liYing wills arc
still widely and confidently urged on patients, and they retain the

and state legislatures continue to amend living will statutes and to
enact new ones.
Courts and administrative agencies too have become advocates

allegiance of many biocthicists, doctors, nurses, social workers,

of li,·ing wills. The Veterans Administration has proposed a rule

and patients. For these loyal adYocates, we offer systematic proof

to encourage the use of adYancc dircctiYes, including living wills.

that such persistence in error is but the triumph of dogma oYer

Where legislatures have not granted living wills legal status,

inquiry and hope OYer experience.
A note about the scope of our contentions: First, we reject

some courts have done so as a matter of common law, and where

only liYing wills, not durable powers of attorney. Second, there

ated with cager enthusiasm. LiYing wills have assumed special

are excellent reasons to be skeptical of liYing wills on principle.

importance in states which prohibit terminating treatment in the
absence of strong evidence of the patient's wishes. One supreme

For example, perhaps former selves should not be able to bind

legislatures have granted them legal status, courts have cooper-

latter sch-es in the ways liYing
wills contemplate. And many

court summarized a common
theme: "[A] written directive

people do and perhaps should
reject the Yiew of patients, their

would provide the most concrete
eYidence of the patient's decisions,

families, and their communities

and we strongly urge all persons
to create such a directive."

that informs living wills. But we
accept for the sake of argument

The grandees of law and

that liYing wills desirably serve
a strong version of patients'

medicine also gi Ye their benedic tion to the liYing will. The AMA's

autonomy. We contend, ncYcrthcless, that liYing wills do not and

Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs proclaims: "Physicians

cannot achieYe that goal.

should encourage their patients to

And a stipulation: We do not

document their treatment prefer-

propose the elimination of li,·ing
wills. We can imagine recom -

ences or to appoint a health care

mending them to patients whose
medical situation is plain, whose

their values regarding health care
and treatment."Thc elite National

crisis is imminent, whose prefer-

Conference of Commissioners on

ences arc specific, strong, and
delineable, and who haYc special

promulgate the Uniform Health-

reasons to prescribe their care.

proxy with whom they can discuss

Uniform State Laws continues to

We argue on the leYel of public policy: In an attempt to extend

Care Decisions Act, a prestigious
model statute that has been put into law in a still -growing number

patients' exercise of autonomy beyond their span of competence,

of states. Medical journals regularly admonish doctors and nurses

resources haYe been lavished to make living wills routine and CYCn

to sec that patients ha,·e ach-ance directives, including liYing wills.

universal. This policy has not produced results that recompense its
costs, and it should therefore be renounced.
Living wills are a bioethical idea that has passed from contro-

Bar journals regularly admonish lawyers that their clients -

all

their clients - need adYancc dircctiYes, including living wills.
Researchers demonstrate their conviction that liYing wills are

Yersy to conventional wisdom, from the counsel of academic

important by the persistence of their studies of patients' attitudes

journals to the commands of law books, from professors'

toward Ii Ying wills and ways of inYeigling patients to sign them.

proposal to professional practice. Advance directives generally
arc embodied in federal policy by the Patient Self-Determination
Act (PSDA), which requires medical institutions to giYe patients
information about their state's adYance dircctiYcs. In turn, the law
of every state pro,·ides for ad,·ance directiYes, almost all states
provide for liYing wills, and most states "ha,·e at least two statutes,
one establishing a living will type directiYe, the other establishing
a proxy or durable power of attorney for health care." Not only
arc all these statutes very much in effect, but new legislative

Not only do legislatures, courts, administratiYe agencies, and
professional associations promote the living will, but other groups
unite with them. The Web abounds in sites adrncating the liYing
will to patients. The Web site for our university's hospital plugs
adYancc dircctiYcs and suggests that it "is probably better to have
written instructions because then everyone can read them and
understand your wishes."
Our own experience in presenting this paper is that its thesis
prornkes some bioethicists to disbelief and indignation. It is as
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though they simply cannot bear to believe that living wills might
not work. How can anything so intuitively right be proved so infuriatingly wrong? And indeed, bioethicists continue to investigate
ways the living will might be extended (to deal with problems of
the mentally ill and of minors, for example) and developed for
other countries.
Although some sophisticated observers have long doubted the
wisdom of living wills, proponents have tended to respond in one
of three ways, all of which preserve an important role for living
wills. First, proponents have supposed that the principal problem
with living wills is that people just won't sign them. These proponents have persevered in the struggle to find ways of getting more
people to sign up.
Second, proponents have reasserted the usefulness of the living
wills. For example, Norman Cantor, distinguished advocate of
living wills, acknowledges that "(s)ome commentators doubt the
utility or efficacy of advance directives," (by which he means the
living will), but he concludes that "these objections don't obviate
the importance of advance directives." Other proponents are
daunted by the criticisms of living wills but offer new justifications for them. Linda Emanual, another eminent exponent of
living wills, writes that "living wills can help doctors and patients
talk about dying" and can thereby "open the door to a positive,
caring approach to death."
Third, some proponents concede the weaknesses of the living
will and the advantages of the durable power of attorney and then
propose a durable power of attorney that incorporates a living
will. That is, the forms they propose for establishing a durable
power of attorney invite their authors to provide the kinds of
instructions formerly confined to living wills.
None of these responses fully grapples with the whole range
of difficulties that confound the policy promoting living wills. In
fairness, this is part!)' because the case against that polic)' has been
made piecemeal and not in a full -fledged and full -throated analysis
of the empirical literature on living wills.
In sum, the law has embraced the principle of living wills and
cheerfully continues to this moment to expound and expand
that principle . Doctors, nurses, hospitals, and lawyers are daily
urged to convince their patients and clients to adopt living wills,
and patients hear their virtues from many other sources besides.
Some advocates of living wills have shifted the grounds for their
support of living wills, but they persist in believing that they are
useful. The time has come to investigate those policies and those
hopes systematically. That is what this article attempts. We ask an
obvious but unasked question: What would it take for a regime
72
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of living wills to function as their advocates hope? First, people
must have living wills. Second, they must decide what treatment
they would want if incompetent. Third, they must accurately and
lucidly state that preference. Fourth, their living wills must be
available to people making decisions for a patient . Fifth, those
people must grasp and heed the living will's instructions. These
conditions are unmet and largely unmeetable.

Do people have living wills?
At the level of principle, living wills have triumphed among the
public as among the princes of medicine. People widely say they
want a living will, and living wills have so much become conventional medical wisdom "that involvement in the process is being
portrayed as a duty to physicians and others ." Despite this, and
despite decades of urging, most Americans lack them. While most
of us who need one have a property will, roughly I 8 percent have
living wills. The chronically or terminally ill are likelier to prepare
living wills than the healthy, but even they do so fitfully. In one
study of dialysis patients, for instance, only 35 percent had a living
will, even though all of them thought living wills a "good idea ."
Why do people flout the conventional wisdom?The flouters
advance many explanations:They don't know enough about living
wills, they think living wills hard to execute, they procrastinate,
they hesitate to broach the topic to their doctors (as their doctors
likewise hesitate). Some patients doubt they need a living will.
Some think living wills are for the elderly or infirm and count
themselves in neither group. Others suspect that living wills
do not change the treatment people receive; 91 percent of the
veterans in one study shared that suspicion. Many patients arc
content or even anxious to delegate decisions to their families,
often because they care less what decisions are made than that
they are made by people they trust . Some patients find living
wills incompatible with their cultural traditions. Thus in the large
SUPPORT and HELP studies, most patients preferred to leave
final resuscitation decisions to their family and physician instead of
having their own preferences expressly followed (70.8 percent in
HELP and 78.0 percent in SUPPORT). "This result is so striking
that it is worth restating: Not even a third of the HELP patients
and hardly more than a fifth of the SUPPORT patients "would
want their own preferences followed."
If people lacked living wills only because of ignorance, living
wills might proliferate with education . But studies seem not to
"support the speculations found in the literature that the low level
of advance directives use is due primarily to a lack of information and encouragement from health care professionals and
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family members." Rather, there is considerable evidence "that the
elderly's action of delaying execution of advance directives and
deferring to others is a deliberate, if not an explicit, refusal to
participate in the advance directives process."
The federal government has sought to propagate living wills
through the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), which
essentially requires medical institutions to inform patients about
advance directives. However, "empirical studies demonstrate
that: the PSDA has generally failed to foster a significant increase
in advance directives use; it is being implemented by medical
institutions and their personnel in a passive manner; and the
involvement of physicians in its implementation is lacking." One
commentator cv<;n thinks "the PSDA's legal requirements have
become a ceiling instead of a floor." In short, people have reasons,
often substantial and estimable reasons, for eschewing living wills,
reasons unlikely to be overcome by persuasion. Indeed, persuasion seems quickly to find its limits. Numerous studies indicate
that without considerable intervention, approximately 20 percent
of us complete living wills, but programs to propagate wills
have mixed results. Some have achieved significant if still limited
increases in the completion of living wills, while others have quite
failed to do so. Thus we must ask: If after so much propaganda so
few of us have living wills, do we really want them, or are we just
saying what we think we ought to think and what investigators
want to hear?

Do people know what they will want?
Suppose, countcrfactually, that people executed living wills.
For those documents to work, people would have to predict their
preferences accurately. This is an ambitious demand. Even patients
making contemporary decisions about contemporary illnesses are
regularly daunted by the decisions' difficulty. They are human.
We humans falter in gathering information, misunderstand and
ignore what we gather, lack well-considered preferences to guide
decisions, and rush headlong to choice. How much harder, then, is
it to conjure up preferences for an unspecifiable future confronted
with unidentifiable maladies with unpredictable treatments?
For example, people often misapprehend crucial background
facts about their medical choices. Oregon has made medical policy
in fresh and controversial ways, has recently had two referenda
on assisted suicide, and alone has legalized it. Presumably, then,
its citizens are especially knowledgeable. But only 46 percent
of them knew that patients may legally withdraw life-sustaining
treatment. Even experience is a poor teacher: "Personal experi ence with illness ... and authoring an advance directive ... were
not significantly associated with better knowledge about options."

Nor do people reliably know enough about ill~esses and treatments to make prospective life-or-death decisions about them.
To take one example from many, people grossly overestimate the
effectiveness of CPR and in fact hardly know what it is. For such
information, people must rely on doctors. But doctors convey
that information wretchedly even to competent patients making
contemporaneous decisions. Living wills can be executed without
even consulting a doctor, and when doctors are consulted, the
conversations arc ordinarily short, vague, and tendentious. In the
Tulsky study, for example, doctors only described either "dire
scenarios ... in which few people, terminally ill or otherwise,
would want treatment" or "situations in which patients could
recover with proper treatment."
Let us put the point differently. The conventional - legal and
ethical - wisdom insists that candidates for even a flu shot give
"informed consent." And that wisdom has increasingly raised
the standards for disclosure. If we applied those standards to the
information patients have before making the astonishing catalog
of momentous choices living wills can embody, the conventional
wisdom would be left shivering with indignation.
Not only do people regularly know too little when they sign
a living will, but often (again, we're human) they analyze their
choices only superficially before placing them in the time capsule.
An ocean of evidence affirms that answers are shaped by the way
questions are asked. Preferences about treatments are influenced
by factors like whether success or failure rates are used, the level
of detail employed, and whether long or short-term consequences
are explained first. Thus in one study, elderly subjects opted for
the intervention 12 percent of the time when it was presented
negatively, 18 percent of the time when it was phrased as in an
advance directive already in use, and 30 percent of the time when
it was phrased positively. Seventy-seven percent of the subjects
changed their minds at least once when given the same case
scenario but a different description of the intervention."
If patients have trouble with contemporaneous decisions, how
much more trouble must they have with prospective ones. For
such decisions to be "true," patients' preferences must be reasonably stable. Surprisingly often, they are not. A famous study of
18 women in a "natural childbirth" class found preferences about
anesthesia and avoiding pain relatively stable before childbirth,
but at "the beginning of active labor (4-5 cm dilation) there was
a shift in the preference toward avoiding labor pains .... During
the transition phase of labor (8 - 10cm) the values remained relatively stable, but then ... the mothers' preferences shifted again
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at postpartum toward avoiding the use of anesthesia during the
deliYery of her next child." And not only are preferences surprisingly labile, but people haYe trouble recognizing that their Yiews
haYe changed. This makes it less likely they will amend their
liYing wills as their opinions develop and more likely that their
living wills will treasonously misrepresent their wishes. Instability
matters. The healthy may incautiously prefer death to disability.
Once stricken, competent patients can test and reject that preference. They often do. Thus Wilfrid Sheed "quickly learned (that)
cancer, eYen more than polio, has a disarming way of bargaining
downward, beginning with your whole estate and then letting you
keep the game warden's cottage or badminton court; and by the
time it has t_ried to frighten you to death and threatened to take
away your ,·ery existence, you'd be amazed at how little you're
willing to settle for."
At least 16 studies have investigated the stability of people's
preferences for life sustaining treatment. A meta -analysis of 11 of
these studies found that the stability of patients' preferences was
71 percent (the range was 57 percent to 89 percent) . Although
stability depended on numerous factors (including the illness, the
treatment, and demographic variables), the bottom line is that,
O\'Cr periods as short as two years, almost one-third of preferences for life-sustaining medical treatment changed. More particularly, illness and hospitalization change people's preferences for
life-sustaining treatments. In a prospective study, the desire for
life sustaining treatment declined significantly after hospitalization
but returned almost to its original leYel three to six months later.
Another study concluded that the "will to li,·e is highly unstable
among terminally ill cancer patients." The authors thought their
findings "perhaps not surprising, given that only 10- 14 percent of
indiYiduals who surviYc a suicide attempt commit suicide during
the next IO years, which suggests that a desire to die is inherently
changeable."
The consistent finding that interest in life-sustaining treatment
shifts over time and across contexts coincides tellingly with
research charting people's struggles to predict their own tastes,
behavior, and emotions even over short periods and under familiar
circumstances. People mispredict what poster they will like, how
much they will buy at the grocery store, how sublimely they will
enjoy an ice cream, and how they will adjust to tenure decisions.
And people "miswant" for numerous reasons. They imagine a
different event from the one that actually occurs, nurture inaccurate theories about what gives them pleasure, forget they might
outwit misery, concentrate on salient negative events and ignore
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offsetting happier ones, and misgauge the effect of physiological
sensations like pain . GiYcn this rich stew of research on people's
missteps in predicting their tastes generally, we should expect
misapprehensions about end-of-life preferences. Indeed, those
preferences should be especially volatile, since people lack experi ence deciding to die .

Can people articulate what they want?
Suppose, arguendo, that patients regularly made sound choices
about future treatments and write liYing wills. Can they articulate their choices accurately?This question is crucially unrealistic,
of course, because the assumption is false. People haYe trouble
reaching well-considered decisions, and you cannot state clearly
on paper what is muddled in your mind. And indeed people do,
for instance, issue mutually inconsistent instructions in living
wills.
But assume this difficulty a,ny and the problem of articulation
persists. In one sense, the best way to divine patients' preferences
is to have them write their own lh·ing wills to give surrogates
the patient's gloriously unmediated rnicc. This is not a practical
policy. Too many people are fun ctionally illiterate, and most of
the literate cannot express themselves clearly in writing. It's hard,
even for the expert writer. Furthermore, most people know too
little about their choices to cover all the relevant subjects. Hence
living wills arc generally forms that demand little writing. But the
forms have failed. For example, "se,·eral studies suggest that even
those patients who have completed AD forms .. . may not fully
understand the function of the form or its language." Living wills
routinely baffie patients with their "syntactic complexity, concept
density, abstractness, organization, coherence, sequence of ideas,
page format, length of line of print, length of paragraph, punctuation, illustrations, color, and reader interest." Unfortunately,
most advance directive forms ... often have neither a reasonable
scope nor depth . They do not ask all the right questions and they
do not ask those questions in a manner that elicits clear responses.
Doctors and lawyers who believe their clients are all above
a,·erage should ask them what their living will says. One of us
[Schneider] has tried the experiment. The modal answer is, in its
entirety: "It says I don't want to be a vegetable ."
No doubt the forms could be improved, but not enough to
matter. The world abounds in dreadfullv drafted forms because
writing complex instructions for the future is crushingly difficult.
Statutes read horribly because their authors are struggling to ( 1)
work out exactly what rule they want, (2) imagine all the
J
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circumstances in which it might apply, and (3) find language
to specify all those but only those circumstances. Each task is
ultimately impossible, which is vvhy statutes explicitly or implicitly confide their enforcers with some discretion and why courts
must interpret - rewrite? - statutes. However, these skills and
resources are not a\'ailable to physicians or surrogates.
One might retort that property wills work and that living wills
arc not that far remov d from property wills. But wills work
as well as they do to distribute property because their scope is
- compared with liYing wills
narrow and routinized. Most
people have little property to distribute and few plausible heirs.
As property accumulates and ambitions swell, problems proliferate. Many of them are resol vable because experts
lawyers
- exclusively draft and interpret wills. Lawyers ha,·e been experimenting for centuries with testamentary language in a process
which has produced standard formulas with predictable meanings
and standard ways of distributing property into which testators
are channeled. Finally, if testators didn't say it clearly enough in
the right words and following the right procedures, courts coolly
ignore their wishes and substitute default rules.
The lamentable history of the living will demonstrates just how
recalcitrant these problems are. There have been, essentially, three
generations of living wills. At first, they stated fatuously general
desires in absurdly general terms. As the vacuity of over generality
became clear, advocates of living wills did the obvious: Were living
wills too general? Make them specific. Were they "one size fits
all"? Make them elaborate questionnaires. Were they uncritically
signed? "Require" probing discussions between doctor and patient.
However, the demand for specificity forced patients to address
more questions than they could comprehend. So, generalities
were insufficiently specific and insufficiently considered. Specifics
were insufficiently general and perhaps still insufficiently considered. What was a doctor - or lawyer
to do? Behold the '\-alues
history," a disquisition on the patient's supposed overarching
beliefs from which to infer answers to specific questions. That
patients can be induced to trek through these interminable and
imponderable documents is unproved and unlikely. That useful
conclusions can be drawn from the platitudes they evoke is false.
As Justice Holmes knew, "General propositions do not decide
concrete cases."
The lessons of this story are that drafting instructions is harder
than proponents of living wills seem to believe and that when you
move toward one blessing in structuring these documents, you
walk away from another. The failure to devise workable forms
is not a failure of effort or intelligence. It is a consequence of
attempting the impossible.

Where is the living will?
Suppose that, mirabile dictu, people executed living wills, knew
what they will want, and could say it. That will not matter unless
the liYing will reaches the people responsible for the incompetent
patient. Often, it does not. This should be no surprise, for long
can be the road from the drafteer's chair to the ICU bed.
First, the living will may be signed years before it is used,
and its existence and location may vanish in the mists of time.
Roughly half of all living wills are drawn up by lawyers and must
somehow reach the hospital, and 62 percent of patients do not
give their living will to their physician. On admission to the
hospital, patients can be too assailed and anxious to recall and
mention their advance directives. Admission clerks can be harried,
neglectful, and loath to ask patients awkward questions.
Thus when a team of researchers reviewed the charts of 182
patients who had completed a living will before being hospitalized, they found that only 26 percent of the charts accurately
recorded information about those directi ves, and only 16 percent
of the charts contained the form. And in another study only 35
percent of the nursing home patients who were transferred to the
hospital had their living wills with them.

Will proxies read it accurately?
Suppose, per impossibile, that patients wrote living wills,
correctly anticipated their preferences, articulated their desires
lucidly, and conveyed their document to its interpreters. How
acutely will the interpreters analyze their instructions? Living
wills are not self-executing: Someone must decide whether the
patient is incompetent, whether a medical situation described in
the living will has arisen, and what the living will then commands.
Usually, the patient's intimates will be central among a living
will's interpreters. We might hope that intimates already know
the patient's mind, so that only modest demands need be made on
their interpreting skills. But many studies have asked such surrogates to predict what treatment the patient would choose. Across
these studies, approximately 70 percent of the predictions were
correct - not inspiring success for life and death decisions.
Do living wills help?We know of only one study that addresses
that question. In a randomized trial, researchers asked elderly
patients to complete a disease- and treatment-based or a valuebased liYing will. A control group of elderly patients completed
no living will. The surrogates were generally spouses or children
who had known the patient for decades. Surrogates who were
not able to consult their loved one's living will predicted patients'
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preferences about 70 percent of the time . Strikingly, surrogates
who consulted the living will did no better than surrogates denied
it. Nor were surrogates more successful when they discussed
living wills with patients just before their prediction.
What is more, a similar study found that primary-care physicians' predictions were similarly unimproved by providing them
with patients' advance directives. On the other hand, emergency
room doctors (complete strangers) given a living will more accurately predicted patients' preferences than ER doctors without
one .

Do living wills alter patient care?
Our surv~y of the mounting empirical evidence shows that
none of the five requisites to making living wills successful social
policy is met now or is likely to be . The program has failed, and
indeed is impossible.
That impossibility is confirmed by studies of how living wills
are implemented which show that living wills seem not to affect
patients' treatments. For instance, one study concluded that living
wills "do not influence the level of medical care overall. This
finding was manifested in the quantitatively equal use of diagnostic
testing, operations, and invasive hemodynamic monitoring among
patients with and without advance directives. Hospital and ICU
lengths of stay, as well as healthcare costs, were also similar for
patients with and without advance directive statements." Another
study found that in 30 of 39 cases in which a patient was incompetent and the living will was in the patient's medical record,
the surrogate decisionmaker was not the person the patient had
appointed. In yet a third study, a quarter of the patients received
care that was inconsistent with their living will.
But all this is normal. Harry Truman rightly predicted that his
successor would "sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And
nothing will happen. Poor Ike - it won't be a bit like the Army.
He'll find it very frustrating." (Of course, the Army isn't like the
Army either, as Captain Truman surely knew.) Indeed, the whole
law of bioethics often seems a whited sepulchre for slaughtered
hopes, for its policies have repeatedly fallen woefully short of their
purposes. Informed consent is a "fairytale." Programs to increase
organ donation have persistently disappointed. Laws regulating
DNR orders are hardly better. Legal definitions of brain death are
misunderstood by astonishing numbers of doctors and nurses. And
so on.
But why don't living wills affect care? Joan Teno and colleagues
saw no evidence "that a physician unilaterally decided to ignore or
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disregard an AD." Rather, there was "a complex interaction of .. .
three themes." First (as we have emphasized), "the contents of ADs
were vague and difficult to apply to current clinical situations."
The imprecision of living wills not only stymies interpreters, it
exacerbates their natural tendency to read documents in light of
their own preferences. Thus"( e )ven with the therapy-specific AD
accompanied by designation of a proxy and prior patient-physician
discussion, the proportion of physicians who were willing to
withhold therapies was quite variable: cardiopulmonary resuscitation, I 00 percent; administration of artificial nutrition and
hydration, 82 percent; administration of antibiotics, 80 percent;
simple tests, 70 percent; and administration of pain medication,
13 percent."
Second, the Teno team found that "patients were not seen as
'absolutely, hopelessly ill,' and thus, it was never considered
the time to invoke the AD." Living wills typically operate when
patients become terminally ill, but neither doctors nor families
lightly conclude patients are dying, especially when that means
ending treatment . And understandably. For instance, "on the
day before death, the median prognosis for patients with heart
failure is still a 50 percent chance to live six more months because
patients with heart failure typically die quickly from an unpredictable complication like arrhythmia or infection." So by the
time doctors and families finally conclude the patient is dying,
the patient's condition is already so dire that treatment looks
pointless quite apart from any living will. "In all cases in which
life-sustaining treatment was withheld or withdrawn, this decision
was made after a trial of life-sustaining treatment and at a time
when the patient was seen as 'absolutely, hopelessly ill' or 'actively
dying.' Until patients crossed this threshold, ADs were not seen as
applicable." Thus "it is not surprising that our previous research
has shown that those with ADs did not differ in timing of DNR
orders or patterns of resource utilization from those without
ADs."
Third, "family members or the surrogate designated in a
[durable power of attorney] were not available, were ineffectual,
or were overwhelmed with their own concerns and did not effectively advocate for the patient." Family members are crucial surrogates because they should be: patients commonly want them to
be; they commonly want to be; they specially cherish the patient's
interests. Doctors ordinarily assume families know the patient's
situation and preferences and may not relish responsibility for
life-and-death decisions, and doctors intent on avoiding litigation may realize that the only plausible plaintiffs are families. The

The death of the living wiU
Carl E. Scl1ncidcr and Ansela Faserlin

family, however, may not direct attention to the advance directive
and may not insist on its enforcement . In fact, surrogates may be
guided by either their own treatment preferences or an urgent
desire to keep their beloved alive.
In sum, not only are we awash in evidence that the prerequisites for a successful living wills policy are unachievable, but
there is direct evidence that living wills regularly fail to have
their intended effect. That failure is confirmed by the numerous
convincing explanations for it. And if living wills do not affect
treatment, they do not work .

Do living wills have beneficial side effects?
Even if living wills do not effectively promote patients'
autonomy, they might have other benefits that justify their costs.
There are three promising candidates.
First, living wills might stimulate conversation between doctor
and patient about terminal treatment. However, at least one study
finds little association between patients' reports of executing an
advance directive and their reports of such conversations. Nor do
these conversations, when they occur, appear satisfactory. James
Tulsky and colleagues asked experienced clinicians with relationships with patients who were over 65 or seriously ill to "discuss
advance directives in whatever way you think is appropriate" with
them . Although the doctors knew they were being taped, the
conversations were impressively short and one-sided:The median
discussion "lasted 5.6 minutes (range, 0.9 to 15.0 minutes).
Physicians spoke for a median of 3.9 minutes (range, 0.6 to 10.9
minutes), and patients spoke for the remaining 7 minutes (range,
0 .3 to 9 .6 minutes) .... Usually, the conversation ended without
any specific follow -up plan ."The "(p)atients' personal values, goals
for care, and reasons for treatment preferences were discussed in
71 percent of cases and were explicitly elicited by 34 percent of
physicians ." But doctors commonly "did not explore the reasons
for patient's preferences and merely determined whether they
wanted specific interventions."
Nor were the conversations conspicuously informative:
"Physicians used vague language to describe scenarios, asking
what patients would want if they became 'very, very sick' or 'had
something that was very serious.' .." Further, "[v]arious qualitative terms were used loosely to describe outcome probabilities."
In addition, these brief conversations considered almost exclusively the two ends of the continuum - the most hopeless and
the most hopeful cases. Conversations tended to ignore "the more
common, less clear-cut predicaments surrounding end-of-life

care."True, the patients all thought "their physici~ns 'did a good
job talking about the issues,"' but this only suggests that patients
did not understand how little they were told .
The second candidate for beneficial side effect arises from
evidence that living wills may comfort patients and surrogates.
People with a living will apparently gain confidence that their
surrogates will understand their preferences and will implement
them comfortably, and the surrogates concur. Improved satisfaction with decisions was also a rare positive effect of the SUPPORT
study (which devoted enormous resources to improving end of
life decisions and care but made dismayingly little difference) . In
another study, living wills reduced the stress and unhappiness of
family members who had recently withdrawn life support from
a relative. But even if living wills make patients and surrogates
more confident and comfortable, those qualities are apparently
unrelated to the accuracy of surrogates' decisions. Thus we are
left with the irony that one of the best arguments for a tool for
enhancing people's autonomy is that it deceives them into confidence.
Third, because living wills generally constrain treatment, they
might reduce the onerous costs of terminal illness. Although
several studies associated living wills with small decreases in those
costs, several studies have reached the opposite conclusion . The
old Scotch verdict, "not proven," seems apt.

The costs
There is no free living will, and the better (or at least more
thorough and careful) the living will, the more it costs. Living
wills consume a patient's time and energy. When doctors or
lawyers help, costs soar. On a broader view, Jeremy Sugarman
and colleagues estimated that the Patient Self-Determination
Act imposed on all hospitals a start-up cost of $101,569,922
and imposed on one hospital (Johns Hopkins) initial costs of
$114,528. These figures omit the expenses, paid even as we write
and you read, of administering the program. And this money has
bought only proforma compliance.
These are real costs incurred when over 40 million people
lack health insurance and when we are spending more of our
gross domestic product on health care than comparable countries
without buying commensurately better health. If programs to
promote and provide living wills showed signs of achieving the
goals cherished for them, we would have to decide whether their
valuable but incalculable rewards exceeded their diffuse but
daunting costs. However, since those programs have failed, their
costs plainly outweigh their benefits.
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What is to be done?
Living wills attempt what undertakers like to call "pre -need
planning," and on inspection they are as otiose as the mortuary
version. Critically, empiricists cannot show that advance directives affect care. This is damning, but were it our only evidence,
perhaps we might not be weary in well doing: for in due season
we might reap, if we faint not. However, our survev of the
evidence suggests that living wills fail not for want ,of effort, or
education, or intelligence, or good will, but because of stubborn
traits of human psychology and persistent features of social
organization.
Thus when we reviewed the five conditions for a successful
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has promoted the execution of uninformed ~nd under-informed
advance directives, and has undermined, not protected, selfdetermination."

If living wills have failed, we must say so. We must say so to
patients. If we believe our declamations about truth-telling, we
should frankly warn patients how faint is the chance that living
wills can have their intended effect. More broadly, we should
abjure programs intended to cajole everyone into signing living
wills. We should also repeal the PSDA, which was passed with
arrant and arrogant indifference to its effectiveness and its costs
and which today imposes accumulating paperwork and adminis trative expense for paltry rewards.
Of course we recognize the problems presented by the

program of.living wills, we encountered evidence that not one
condition has been achieved or, we think, can be. First, despite

decisions that must be made for incompetent patients, and

the millions of dollars lavished on propaganda, most people do

our counsel is not wholly negative. Patients anxious to control
future medical decisions should be told about durable powers of

not have living wills. And they often have considered and considerable reasons for their choice. Second, people who sign living
wills have generally not thought through its instructions in a way
we should want for life -and -death decisions. Nor can we expect
people to make thoughtful and stable decisions about so complex
a question so far in the future. Third, drafters of living wills have
failed to offer people the means to articulate their preferences
accurately. And the fault lies primarily not with the drafters; it lies
with the inherent impossibility of living wills' task. Fourth, living
wills too often do not reach the people actually making decisions
for incompetent patients. This is the most remediable of the five
problems, but it is remediable only with unsustainable effort and
unjustifiable expense. Fifth, living wills seem not to increase the
accuracy with which surrogates identify patients' preferences. And
the reasons we surveyed when we explained why living wills do
not affect patients' care suggest that these problems arc insurmountable.
The cost-benefit analysis here is simple: If living wills lack
detectable benefits, they cannot justify any cost, much less the
considerable costs they now exact. Any attempt to increase their
incidence and their availability to surrogates must be expensive.
And the evidence suggests that broader use of living wills can
actually disserve rather than promote patients' autonomy: If, as
we have argued, patients sign living wills without adequate reflection, lack necessary information, and have fluctuating preferences anyway, then living wills will not lead surrogates to make
the choices patients would have wanted. Thus, as Pope suggests,
the "PSDA, rather than promoting autonomy has 'done a disservice to most real patients and their families and caregivers.' It
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attorney. These surely do not guarantee patients that their wishes
will blossom into fact, but nothing does. What matters is that
powers of attorney have advantages over living wills. First, the
choices that powers of attornev demand of patients arc rclativelv
few, familiar, and simple. Seco~d, a regime of powers of attorn:v
requires little change from current practice, in which family
'
members ordinarily act informally for incompetent patients.
Third, powers of attorney probably improve decisions for
patients, since surrogates know more at the time of the decision
than patients can know in advance. Fourth, powers of attorney are
cheap; they require only a simple form easily filled out with little
advice. Fifth, pow·crs of attorney can be supplemented by legislation (already in force in some states) akin to statutes of intestacy.
These statutes specify who is to act for incompetent patients
who have not specified a surrogate. In short, durable powers of
attorney are -

as these things go -

simple , direct, modest,

straightforward, and thrifty.
In social policy as in medicine, plausible notions can turn out
to be bad ideas. Bad ideas should be renounced. Bloodletting once
seemed plausible, but when it demonstrably failed, the course
of wisdom was to abandon it, not to insist on its virtues and to
scrounge for alternative justifications for it. Living wills were
praised and peddled before thev were fullv developed much less
studied. They have now failed r~peated te;ts of practi~e. It is time
to say, "enough."
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